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This work tries to analyze why, in certain countries, the rivalry between bro-
adband platforms has no effect on broadband deployment. Controlling for
demographic features and network variables, we focus on analyzing the im-
pact of regulations on the competitiveness of platforms offering an alter-
native to the dominant platform (xDSL). To reach this objective, this pa-
per draws on data from cable and optical fiber platforms in the Spanish
market. We find that the impact of different regulatory frameworks has cri-
tically affected the competitiveness of cable platforms and, in consequence,
harmed inter-platform competition. By contrast, our results show that re-
gulation is not discouraging the current spread of optical fiber platforms.
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cable platform, investment.
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M
aximizing the deployment of broadband networks has been a priority for many
governments, who see, in the spread of these new platforms, an opportunity
for economic growth and for increasing the productivity of firms. In keeping
with this aim, several studies have sought to identify those variables that might
encourage a greater distribution of this service across the population.
Inter-platform competition –the competition arising from the rivalry between
different technological platforms– has been identified as the most common driver of
broadband adoption [Distaso et al. (2006); Bouckaert et al. (2010)]. However, Fageda
et al. (2014) showed that the key factor accounting for the development of the broad-
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band market in Spain was competition based on the regulated access of alternative
operators to the network of the incumbent operator (or intra-platform competition).
A possible explanation for the modest effect of inter-platform competition in
the Spanish market concerns the insufficient development of cable platforms, which
have been the main competitor to the dominant broadband platform (xDSL) devel-
oped from the traditional public telephone network. The hypothesis we test in this
paper is that the regulatory framework designed for the deployment of cable plat-
forms could have skewed the decisions taken by operators with regard to the geo-
graphical areas in which they should concentrate their investments. If this is the case,
it means that a regulatory failure has precluded the optimal deployment of cable plat-
forms in the Spanish market by distorting economic incentives. According to Sidack
and Spulber (1997), the regulator’s attenuation of economic incentives would cre-
ate additional efficiency problems.
Here, we examine, econometrically, the factors influencing the deployment of
two distinct technologies –cable platforms and optical fiber platforms– using data
for the Spanish provinces during the initial years of development of these techno -
logies. It should be borne in mind that the regulatory frameworks designed for each
technological platform were very different in Spain and that this probably conditioned
the operators’ differing investment location strategies.
Regarding that, similarities at the demand and supply levels between cable and
fiber allow us to identify the impact of the different regulatory frameworks. On the
demand side, the residential user has been the main target of the cable and optical
fiber companies. Several reports by the Spanish regulatory agency show that the vol-
ume of residential users among cable and optical fiber operators exceeded 85% of
their total client portfolio [CMT (2005); CMT (2006); CMT (2010); CMT (2011)]. On
the supply side, both technologies offer a high quality product in relation to alter-
native products in the market (mainly xDSL technology). In the early 2000s the ca-
ble platforms were offering a higher bandwidth than xDSL. This is also the case for
optical fiber technology, which, in 2010, offered higher speed data transmission than
xDSL technology. Also, unlike xDSL, both technologies are able to offer a product
bundling different services, including pay-per-view TV. Pay-per-view television ser-
vices on xDSL platforms were much more limited and did not reach an optimum
level of quality. That is the reason why most Spanish xDSL operators made plans
to deploy optical fiber networks, from 2009.
Very few studies have analyzed the impact of regulation on investments of this
type. Exceptions are Briglauer et al. (2013) and Briglauer (2014), which analyzed
the impact of regulating access to the xDSL network2 on the deployment of alter-
native telecommunication platforms (cable or optical fiber). Here, however, our fo-
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(2) National Regulatory Agencies based their decision to regulate access to xDSL networks on the
so-called “investment ladder” theory [Cave (2003); Cave et al. (2001)]. In a first phase, this theory jus-
tified the obligation to provide access to the incumbent operator’s network as a way of reducing en-
try barriers to new operators. A second phase consisted in promoting investment from the latter in their
own infrastructures, in order to increase competitiveness with respect to the costs of the incumbent
operator. Thus, the regulation of access to the xDSL network of the incumbent operator (Telefónica
de España) allowed the entry of many alternative operators in the market.
cus is on determining the role played by the regulatory framework specifically de-
signed for alternative networks to xDSL technology. Furthermore, the fact there are
two types of operators deploying optical fiber platforms discourages analysis of
xDSL regulation. Indeed, the operators which have invested in optical fiber platforms
are formed, on the one hand, by the incumbent xDSL operator that owns the regu-
lated xDSL platform and, on the other hand, the alternative xDSL operators that de-
mand this regulated xDSL service. The different nature of these operators makes it
difficult to identify the effect of xDSL regulation on optical fiber investments as it
depends on the type of optical fiber operator.
To carry out the study, we first need to identify the main explanatory variables
of the level of deployment of broadband platforms. Extensive literature finds sev-
eral links between investment in telecommunication platforms and the attributes of
countries or regions, such as income per capita [Friederiszick et al. (2008); Monto-
lio and Trillas (2013)], education and age of the population [Fairlie (2004); Goldfarb
and Prince (2008); Horrigan (2009)], population density [Chung (2006)] and market size
[Prieger (2003); Tang (2009)]. Hence, our empirical analysis takes into account the
different drivers of investment in broadband platforms, as identified by the literature.
We assume that one of the primary goals of regulatory policy is to promote com-
petition for the benefit of consumers. In this regard, this article firstly, identifies a
case of regulation failure in the Spanish broadband market and secondly, highlights
the detrimental effects this regulatory policy has had in relation to the objectives it
was designed to meet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 analyzes the regulatory
policy applying to the alternatives to xDSL broadband technology (that is, cable and
optical fiber). In Section 2, we present the empirical model explaining the spread of
broadband services via cable and optical fiber platforms and discuss the results. Fi-
nally, Section 3 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DEPLOYING CABLE AND OPTICAL
FIBER PLATFORMS IN SPAIN
In the early 1990s, the regulatory framework that would determine the deploy -
ment of cable networks in Spain was designed. Thus, the Cable Telecommunications
Act (Act 42/1995 of December 22) determined that cable operators required a prior
grant, in the form of a government concession, to initiate their investment in cable net-
works. Furthermore, it was stipulated that cable operators had to provide their telecom-
munication services in specific geographical zones. In keeping with this objective, the
Spanish government divided the national market into 43 geographical zones.
The Act also established that a maximum of two cable operators could operate
in each geographical zone, but that the first of the two government concessions for
each zone would be granted to Telefónica de España –the former public monopoly–
in those areas in which this operator expressed an interest in providing cable services.
In the case of the second government concession for each zone, the law stipulated
that these would be granted on the basis of public tenders.
In the case of the first concession granted in each zone to Telefónica de España,
this operator never deployed cable platforms in Spain, as it preferred to offer broad-
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band services via xDSL platforms. The second concession was granted to 29 different
cable operators, across the 43 geographical zones, in which a total of 74 different
firms participated. This fragmentation of the ownership of cable operators was, in
many cases, detrimental to their decision making. In contrast, their main competi-
tor, Telefónica de España, enjoyed full autonomy in its strategies, which gave it a
significant strategic advantage over the cable operators.
Past studies point to the existence of economies of scale and density in firms
that operate in network industries [Douglas and Christensen (1988); Sidak and Spul-
ber (1998)], specifically in the telecommunications sector [Ng (2012); Mancuso
(2012)]. That is, they have found a positive and significant effect of these variables
(population density and network size) on the competitiveness of firms. In this sense,
the division of the territory into zones limited exploitation of the market through
economies of scale and density. Further, the long-term investment commitment made
by cable operators in each zone meant they were unable to choose where to con-
centrate their investments in order to maximize economies of scale and density.
It should be noted that the national regulation that determined the expansion of ca-
ble networks in Spain was not integrated into a coordinated regulatory policy at the Eu-
ropean Community level. In relation to this, it can be said that the European cable op-
erators became regulated by the Community framework, from 2002, in the field of
Electronic Communications3 (known as the Telecom package). By then, practically all
European countries (including Spain) had developed their own national cable deploy-
ment plans. It should be noted that the deployment of cable platforms has never been
affected by specific regulatory access obligations within this community framework.
The deployment of optical fiber networks began more than a decade after the
birth of cable networks in Spain, but today this new technology has entered a phase
of substantial expansion. Interestingly, the regulatory framework of these platforms
is quite different from that governing cable platform. It was in 2009 that Spain’s reg-
ulatory commission for telecommunication services (Comisión del Mercado de las
Telecomunicaciones, CMT) finally approved measures to manage the deployment
of new optical fiber networks4. The CMT ruled that the geographic market for these
would comprise a single zone covering the entire national territory.
Additionally, Telefónica de España was identified as an operator with signifi-
cant market power (SMP) and, as such, the Spanish regulator –CMT– imposed spe-
cific obligations on the firm. Telefónica was required to provide access to its civil
works infrastructure (ducts and chambers) to other operators at prices calculated to
cover production costs.
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(3) The “Telecom package” defined the European regulatory framework and was aimed at making the
electronic communications networks and services sector more competitive. It was formed by directives
2002/21/CE (framework), 2002/20/CE (authorization), 2002/19/CE (access), 2002/22/CE (universal ser-
vice) and 2002/58/CE (privacy and electronic communications). Subsequently, in 2009, these directives
were modified by the directives 2009/140/CE (better regulation) and 2009/136/CE (citizens’ rights).
(4) On 22 January 2009, the CMT board approved the definition of the market for wholesale (phys-
ical) network infrastructure access at a fixed location and wholesale broadband access, the designa-
tion of an operator with significant market power, and the enforcement of specific obligations (file
nº. MTZ 2008/626).
Alternative optical fiber operators (unlike cable operators) were thereby free to
invest in any part of the national territory, and use Telefónica’s infrastructure, so re-
ducing their deployment costs. The CMT noted that the civil works infrastructure could
hardly be replicated by new entrants as this would represent between 50 and 80% of
their total investment [CMT (2009): pp. 71]. Thus, the aim was to reduce the investment
costs of these alternative optical fiber operators. In relation to bitstream wholesale ac-
cess to Telefónica’s optical fiber network, we must point out that the first regulatory mea-
sures were taken by CNMC after the period analyzed in this paper [CNMC (2014)].
The regulation of optical fiber platforms at the national level arose from the Com-
munity regulatory framework, applied from 2002, in the field of electronic commu-
nications. Regarding this, the European Commission published the Recommendation
of 17 December 2007, on relevant product and service markets within the electronic
communications sector, liable to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive
2002/21/EC. The availability of wholesale access to network infrastructure at a fixed
location was one of the service markets that, according to the aforementioned recom-
mendation, may be subject to ex ante regulation. Based on this, the CMT analyzed the
access market to broadband networks in Spain and established, in 2009, the main guide-
lines that would regulate the spread of fiber optic networks, as we have explained above.
In both cases –cable and optical fiber platforms– the operators only began to
invest once the national regulatory agencies (NRA) had designed the regulatory
framework. To shed light on this process, the following table lists the number of in-
stalled accesses5 by main broadband platforms in the early years of the first and sec-
ond decades of the current century. It is worth noting that these two periods were the
early phases of deployment, corresponding to cable (2003-2005) and optical fiber
platforms (2011-2013), respectively.
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(5) Installed accesses are defined as those broadband accesses that are currently operative or which
could become operative at short notice.
Table 1: NUMBER OF INSTALLED ACCESSES BY BROADBAND PLATFORMS
Copper pairs Cable Optical Fiber
(xDSL) (HFC) (FTTx) Other Total
2003 17,662,787 5,458,569 – 444,511 23,565,867
2004 16,977,593 6,338,897 – 420,104 23,736,594
2005 16,762,566 7,219,129 – 413,978 24,395,673
2011 16,065,690 9,497,692 2,290,986 248,914 28,103,282
2012 15,740,106 9,797,680 3,925,149 236,754 29,699,689
2013 15,539,052 10,038,178 6,875,813 279,072 32,732,115
Source: Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC).
Table 1 shows that the most prevalent platforms in the territory are based on
xDSL technology. Using this technology, the incumbent (Telefónica de España) and
alternative xDSL operators offer broadband services. The prevalence of cable plat-
forms has increased throughout the territory in recent years, although the annual
growth rates have been falling. In the case of the latest optical fiber platforms, the
annual growth of installed accesses has recently increased exponentially, and it is ex-
pected that the number of optical fiber accesses will soon exceed those of cable.
Below, we analyze how the alternative broadband platforms of cable and opti-
cal fiber have been deployed throughout the territory. If the investment decisions
taken by the operators were based on purely economic reasoning, the two platforms
should show similar patterns in terms of the location of their investments. However,
if we find very different results for the two platforms, this would support the hy-
pothesis that the regulatory framework has prevented both of these platforms from
optimizing their investments in the territory.
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY POLICIES APPLIED TO THE BROADBAND MARKET
In this section, we assess whether the deployment of cable and optical fiber plat-
forms in Spain has been optimal. As discussed, it should be stressed that the com-
petitiveness of these operators will be determined by the fact that they can take ad-
vantage of the economies of scale and density present in telecommunication
networks. Thus, if our results reject this hypothesis –that is, an optimal network de-
ployment– then we would conclude that this situation had damaged the competi-
tiveness of the operators. At the same time, this factor would have weakened the ef-
fectiveness of inter-platform competition and made intra-platform competition the
driving force behind the spread of broadband services in Spain.
The empirical literature has identified the variables that account for the loca-
tion of broadband operator investments. Briefly, the following table summarizes the
characteristics of demand that, according to the economics literature, identify those
areas where operators focus their investments in broadband platforms, regardless of
the type of technology they employ.
As noted above, we analyze whether these variables have effectively determined
the zones in which Spanish cable operators have focused their investments. This ex-
ercise is replicated for optical fiber operators. Once we have identified the variables
that explain the deployment of cable and optical fiber platforms in the Spanish mar-
ket, we analyze the role played by regulation, with respect to the economic efficiency
of investments.
2.1. Data
In this section, we describe the data and variables used to estimate a model that
accounts for the volume of stock investment in broadband platforms at the provin-
cial level (NUTS-3 level). Specifically, we present the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables used.
In the case of the dependent variable, several previous studies use the stock of
civil infrastructure deployed by operators as their approximation of the level of stock
investment [Briglauer et al. (2013); Friederiszick et al. (2008)]. Here, the dependent
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variable (INFR) is built from the accesses installed by the operators of a given tech-
nology (cable or optical fiber), located in each of the Spanish provinces. Broadband
access data are taken from the information required by Comisión Nacional de los
Mercados y la Competencia6 (CNMC) from the Spanish telecom operators. The data
have been directly extracted from this source. Since 2006, the Informe de penetración
de servicios finales y de infraestructuras de Telecomunicaciones –an annual report
of the Spanish regulatory agency of telecommunications– publishes information
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Table 2: DEMAND FEATURES EXPLAINING
INVESTMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Variable Empirical evidence Literature
Income per capita The level of income per Horrigan (2009); Goldfarb
capita has a positive and and Prince (2008); Fairlie
significant effect on (2004); Friederiszick, H.,
investment in Grajek, M. and Röller, L.
telecommunication (2008); Montolio and
platforms. Trillas (2013)
Education Education is one of the Horrigan (2009); Prieger
driving forces promoting (2003); Fairlie (2004);
investment in broadband Goldfarb and Prince (2008)
platforms.
Population density There is a positive and Montolio and Trillas (2013);
significant relationship Chung (2006)
between population density
and total investment in
broadband platforms.
Market size Market size positively Prieger (2003); Tang (2009)
affects investment in
broadband platforms.
Population The higher the average Horrigan (2009)
distribution by age age of population, the
lower the level of
investment in
telecommunications.
(6) At the end of 2013, the Spanish government created a new regulator (Comisión Nacional de los
Mercados y la Competencia, CNMC) with the aim of reforming the institutional framework of com-
petition and regulatory policies. This agency absorbed the Spanish competition authority (Comisión
Nacional de Competencia, CNC) and practically all industry regulators (Comisión del Mercado de
las Telecomunicaciones, CMT; Comisión Nacional de la Energía, CNE; and Comisión Nacional del
Sector Postal, CNSP).
about the stock in facilities in broadband platforms. Furthermore, it can currently be
found in the CNMC database (CNMC Datos estadísticos <http://data.cnmc.es>).
In order to estimate the deployment of cable platforms, we collected data from the
eleven largest cable operators (Auna; Euskaltel; MED Telecom; ONO; Procono; R Ca-
ble and telecommunications Coruña, SA; R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Galicia; RE -
TECAL sociedad; Castilla-Leon telecommunications; Telecable de Asturias, and
Tenaria), from 2003 to 2005. Note that this sample includes the full supply of cable ser-
vices throughout the national territory. However, data are not available for all operators
for all the years in this period, mainly due to the intense process of mergers that occurred.
The sample only includes data from between 2003 and 2005 because we wished
to focus on the investment decisions made by operators in the first few years of ac-
tivity, given that these decisions had a decisive bearing on their future cost-effec-
tiveness7. Moreover, in this way we are able to compare these results with those ob-
tained for optical fiber platforms, which currently find themselves in a similar initial
phase (i.e. similar to that experienced by cable platforms between 2003 and 2005).
To estimate optical fiber deployment, the data set comprises data from 2011 to
2013, for the same provinces as identified above for cable operators. Here, we in-
clude five operators (Colt Telecom; Jazztel; Orange; Telefónica de España, and Voda-
fone) which, together, accounted for the entire optical fiber supply in the country dur-
ing that period.
Regarding that, we should point out that the characteristics of the cable and op-
tical fiber operators entering the market were slightly different. The majority of the
cable operators, as with optical fiber operators, were subsidiaries of multinational
corporations, but there were some cable operators with majority ownership of re-
gional companies (Euskaltel and Telecable). Nevertheless, this potentially confoun -
ding factor should have a modest effect in our results.
The explanatory variables considered in our analysis are the same for both tech-
nologies examined and refer to the economic and demographic attributes of the pro -
vinces and their size. Firstly, we consider income per capita in the province (GDP). As
noted above, the economics literature identifies this variable as being key in explai ning
the geographical areas in which broadband operators concentrate their investments. Ac-
cordingly, demand for telecommunication services grows as income levels rise.
Montolio and Trillas (2013) point out that the explanatory variable GDP might
be endogenous to the level of investment in broadband platforms, i.e. income per
capita by region (GDP) could be significantly influenced by the level of broadband
investments made. To avoid this problem, we use the unemployment rate (UNEM-
PLOYMENT) and the number of large firms in relation to the total population
(LARGE_FIRMS) as instruments in our panel data framework. These variables are
highly correlated with the GDP per capita variable but much less influenced by in-
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(7) Although the Cable Telecommunications Act was passed in 1995, licenses were granted to ca-
ble operators in 1998 and 1999. The lack of data for the period 1999-2002 is a limitation of our data
that must be taken into account in the interpretation of results. Nevertheless, this limitation should
have a modest effect in our results because in our regressions we use the stock of investment variable
instead of the year-to-year change in stock. The use of stocks rather than investments allows us to take
into account the investment made from the beginning of the deployment in our regressions.
vestments in broadband networks. Note that such investments are capital intensive
and are not necessarily executed by large firms located in the region concerned. In-
deed, 40 of the 52 Spanish provinces did not have any telecommunication compa-
nies among the large firms registered in their territory. The province with the great-
est presence of telecommunication companies was Madrid, although they only
accounted for 1.3% of its total number of large firms. This fact minimizes the prob-
ability of there being a strong relationship between investment level in telecommu-
nications (INFR) and major companies located in the province (LARGE_FIRMS).
We also include several demographic variables. When determining where to fo-
cus their investments, operators make their decisions at a geographical scale that is
smaller than that of the province. This is because each province may contain a set
of highly heterogeneous municipalities. Therefore, broadband operators determine
their investments at the municipal level or, if the municipality is especially large, at
an even smaller level. For this reason, we collected the demographic features of each
province at a smaller level than that of the whole province.
According to the economics literature (see Table 2), population density is an im-
portant explanatory variable in the level of investment made by operators. This is
based on the argument that areas with a high population density will create signifi-
cant economies of density (i.e. the higher the population density, the greater the de-
ployment and maintenance cost savings for operators). Therefore, operators are ex-
pected initially to choose those provinces with the highest population density.
To capture this effect, we employ the urban density variable by province (DENS
_URB). The variable estimates the population living in municipalities of over
10,000 inhabitants, in relation to the whole province. The authors ruled out using the
population density of the whole region because this variable includes rural areas (mu-
nicipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants), which are not a relevant variable in
the investment plans of broadband operators.
Since the relevant geographic dimension is that of the municipal level, we also
consider the number of major population centers within each province. To this end,
the variable CITY_MEDIUM contains the number of cities in a province of an in-
termediate size (a population of between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants). Like-
wise, the variable CITY_LARGE refers to the number of cities in a province with more
than 500,000 inhabitants. Telecom operators should focus their initial investments in
these larger cities where they can take greater advantage of economies of scale and
economies of density. To this point, the CITY_MEDIUM and CITY_LARGE variables
show the provinces in which there is a higher population concentration. They cap-
ture population density at the municipality level, while the variable URBAN den-
sity captures population density at the province level.
The CAPITAL variable measures the concentration of the population in the ter-
ritory. Specifically, it measures the population of the capital of each province in re-
lation to the total population of that province. As noted above, broadband operators
will opt to focus their investments in provinces in which the population is most con-
centrated.
In short, telecommunications operators decide where to make their invest-
ments on the basis of a territory’s demographic characteristics. Therefore, if Span-
ish operators have designed their investment plans based solely on economic crite-
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ria, in our econometric model all these variables should have a significant and pos-
itive impact on investment.
An additional factor that we consider is the variable ISLAND, which is a
dummy variable taking the value 1 when the province is made up of one or more is-
lands and 0 when the region is located on the mainland. If broadband operators de-
cide to provide telecommunication services on an island, they might incur higher de-
ployment costs than on the mainland. Consequently, we would expect a negative
relationship between this variable and the investment level in a province.
As we use the total number of installed accesses by province as our dependent
variable, we need to take into account the size of each of these provinces. Thus, the
variable EXT_URB identifies the total area in km2 taken up by the urban popula-
tion in a given region. We consider the urban population variable to be more apt than
total population of the province because broadband operators start investment only
in areas over a minimum threshold of population size (over 10,000 inhabitants). This
may explain why the total population variable was not statistically significant in any
additional regression that we ran with this alternative measure of province size.
Finally, our model analyzes the amount of broadband investment by region, over
three years. Accordingly, we add year dummies to consider time fixed effects in our
model. Thus, the variable YEAR1 takes the value 1 when the data by province refer
to the first year, and 0 when they refer to the second or third year in the sample. Like-
wise, the variable YEAR2 takes the value 1 when the data refer to the second year,
and 0 when they refer to the other two years. YEAR3 is the reference year.
As noted above, the economics literature (see Table 2) identifies the educational
level of the population as an explanatory variable of investment volume in broadband
networks. Despite this evidence, we do not use it as an independent variable in our
econometric model as we found a high level of correlation between level of educa-
tion and income per capita. That is, the educational level in Spain is strongly influ-
enced by income levels. In order to avoid multicollinearity, the empirical analysis
focuses on identifying only the effect of the income level of the population on broad-
band deployment.
The data for constructing most of the explanatory variables (GDP, EXT_URB,
DENS_URB, CITY_MEDIUM, CITY_LARGE, CAPITAL, FIRMS_LARGE) have
been obtained from INE, the National Institute of Statistics in Spain. In addition, we
have taken information from the Spanish Economics Yearbook, published annually
by the financial institution La Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, to create
the UNEMPLOYMENT variable.
The analysis of the investment in cable platforms uses unbalanced panel data
with a total of 137 observations. Likewise, the investment in optical fiber networks
has been estimated from unbalanced panel data comprising 150 observations. The
reason for this difference is that cable operators invested in fewer regions between
2003 and 2005 than did the optical fiber operators between 2011 and 2013, i.e. in
the respective initial deployments of these technologies, optical fiber networks were
implemented in more regions.
Tables 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate
investment in cable and fiber optic platforms by regions.
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We have used the same explanatory variables in both investment models, but
the data correspond to different time periods (2003-2005 in the case of cable plat-
forms and 2011-2013 in that of fiber platforms). Recall that the aim of this paper is
to analyze the geographical spread of broadband platforms (cable and optical fiber)
made by operators in the initial years of activity, and so the investment model for each
corresponds to a different time period.
Tables 5 and 6 provide the matrix of bivariate correlations for the variables used
in the cable and optical fiber estimations.
The results from Tables 5 and 6 eliminate the possibility of multicollinearity,
as the correlation between the variables is not high for any one pair of variables con-
sidered.
2.2. Econometric specification and results
Taking the previous hypotheses into consideration, the equation to be estimated
can be expressed in the following form:
Revista de Economía Aplicada
20
β β β βINFR = const+ GDP + EXT_URB + DENS_URB ,+ CITY_MEDIUM +
i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 i,t
β β β β β ε+ ++ CITY_LARGE CAPITAL ISLAND + YEAR1 + YEAR2 +
5 i,t 6 i,t 7 i,t 8 i,t 9 i,t i,t
All variables are expressed in logarithms so that the coefficients can be inter-
preted as elasticities. The level of investment in broadband networks (INFR) in
province i during period t is a function of: (a) the level of income per capita (GDP)
in province i during period t; (b) the urban density (DENS_URB) of province i dur-
ing period t; (c) the number of medium-sized cities (CITY_MEDIUM) in province
i during period t; (d) the number of large-sized cities (CITY_LARGE) in province
i during period t; (e) the percentage of population concentrated in the capital (CAP-
ITAL) of province i during period t; (f) the fact that province i is formed by islands
(ISLAND); (g) the urban area (EXT_URB) of province i; (h) a time variable (YEAR1)
that identifies the first year of the sample, and (i) a time variable (YEAR2) that iden-
tifies the second year of the sample.
From this econometric specification, we estimate four different models for each
broadband platform analyzed (cable and optical fiber). These models were estimated
using the two-stage least squares (IV/2SLS) method. In all econometric estimations,
the sample was indexed by the region in which the investment is located. As a re-
sult, standard errors were clustered by province to correct for the possible presence
of autocorrelation and to account for the particularity of the dataset having been de-
signed as panel data.
As explained, the variable income per capita (GDP) is instrumented through the
variables unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT) and the number of large com-
panies in relation to the total population (FIRMS_LARGE) by region.
We do not include province fixed effects as this would mean focusing within
variations in our data, whereas the focus of our analysis is on the differences in broad-
band investment across provinces. A further reason why we discard the fixed effects
model is that the time variable is limited (just three years) in comparison to the to-
tal number of observations. In a fixed effects model, this would result in a lower re-
liability of the outcome obtained from the estimations.
Interestingly, it has been pointed out that the dependent variable (the number
of installed accesses of a given broadband platform by region) may be affected by
a potential autocorrelation problem [Grajek and Röller (2009)]. In our context, this
is not necessarily the case since the historical series comprises data for just three
years. Additionally, and as noted above, clustering investment data by province helps
to correct a hypothetical problem of autocorrelation. In any case, and in line with the
aim of this paper, the main interest of the empirical analysis is the territorial distri-
bution of investment in the expansion of broadband platforms and not the historical
evolution of investment itself.
Based on this methodology, the following table displays the results obtained from
four models built to estimate the broadband investment made by cable operators be-
tween 2003 and 2005. The different models combine different sets of explanatory vari-
ables. Specifically, we do not jointly consider the variables of number of medium-sized
cities, number of large cities and proportion of population in the capital.
The results in Table 7 show that the presence of medium- or large-sized cities
is not a key factor for cable operators when deciding where to focus their investments
at the province level. Likewise, the concentration ratio in terms of population located
in the capital of the province is not a significant variable.
However, the urban density variable by province has a significant and positive
effect on broadband investment, which seems to indicate that cable operators drew
up plans focusing their investment on the most attractive provinces in terms of pop-
ulation density. That is, the diffusion of cable platforms throughout the territory did
not occur randomly but rather operators made their investment decisions rationally.
Yet, if we focus our analysis at the municipal level, we see that the results for the
rest of the demographic variables indicate that the operators did not concentrate their
investments in those municipalities that, a priori, offered greater opportunities for
the exploitation of economies of density and scale.
The income per capita variable is statistically significant, but the coefficient is
negative. This means the level of investment in cable platforms was inversely pro-
portional to the province’s income per capita. This result is the opposite of that re-
ported in previous studies examining the factors that might account for the deploy-
ment of telecommunication platforms.
Note that we ran several specification tests, including an exogeneity test and a ro-
bustness analysis of the instruments used in the regression. As shown in Table 7, the
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis of or-
thogonality between the regressors and the instruments. Meanwhile, the F-statistics of
the instruments in the first stage of the estimation (see Appendix A) show that they are
strong. In short, these two tests support the instruments used in our econometric model.
The dummy variable indicating whether broadband investment is made in a
province comprising one or more islands is not statistically significant. Finally, the
dichotomous time variables (YEAR1 and YEAR2) reveal a significant and negative
effect. The coefficients for these variables (around 0.30 and 0.21, respectively) show
that, from 2003 to 2005, the volume of cable investments grew moderately.
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Table 8 shows the results from the same four models as above but here explai -
ning the deployment of optical fiber platforms.
The results in the case of optical fiber platforms, unlike those described above
for cable platforms, are very similar to those reported elsewhere in the economics
literature. Thus, all the demographic variables have a significant and positive effect
on broadband investment levels. Indeed, the urban density variable is positive and
significant in all four empirical models. The number of medium- and large-sized
cities is also positive and significant, indicating that fiber optic operators have fo-
cused their investment on major urban municipalities. Finally, the empirical results
show that optical fiber operators have taken into account the degree of concentra-
tion of the population in each region (CAPITAL).
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Table 7: INVESTMENT IN CABLE PLATFORMS BY PROVINCES (2SLS)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 10.7288 8.8230 9.0012 9.5358
(5.1460)** (4.8176)* (4.6286)** (4.4052)**
log GDP -1.0823 -0.9097 -0.9191 -1.0275
(0.5270)** (0.4947)* (0.4960)* (0.4894)**
log Ext_urbana 0.7891 0.8155 0.8074 0.8427
(0.0915)*** (0.0919)*** (0.6822)*** (0.0553)***
Island -0.2586 -0.3025 -0.2756 -0.3167
(0.2709) (0.2537) (0.2562) (0.2398)
log Dens_urbana 0.9897 0.9962 0.9915 1.0067







Year1 -0.3083 -0.3025 -0.3035 -0.3229
(0.0747)*** (0.0739)*** (0.0750)*** (0.0716)***
Year2 -0.2189 -0.2156 -0.2163 -0.2230
(0.0454)*** (0.0455)*** (0.0447)*** (0.0454)***
N 137 137 137 137
Provinces 47 47 47 47
R2 0.7987 0.7954 0.7962 0.8034
Hansen J 0.142 0.482 0.428 1.105
Test F 10.79*** 13.08*** 12.02*** 13.87***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
In short, telecom operators that have deployed optical fiber infrastructure in the
national territory have concentrated their investments in those municipalities that of-
fer the greatest opportunities for benefiting from economies of density and scale.
Here, according to the empirical results, the number of cities with a population of
over 500,000 is the most important factor explaining the level of investment by re-
gion made by operators. That is, the optical fiber platform has been introduced mainly
in larger cities in the early years of its diffusion throughout the territory.
These results also show that, as well as taking into account the urban density
of each region, optical fiber operators concentrated their investments in larger mu-
nicipalities. In contrast, the fact that cable operators did not focus their investments
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Table 8: INVESTMENT IN OPTICAL FIBER PLATFORMS BY PROVINCE (2SLS)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -3.1851 -10.4275 -12.8770 -15.9271
(6.0700) (8.3226) (7.7023)* (9.7610)*
log GDP 0.9408 1.2879 1.5972 1.4739
(0.5387)* (0.7722)* (0.7183)** (0.9233)*
log Ext_urbana 0.3225 0.6394 0.5929 0.9185
(0.1364)*** (0.1670)*** (0.1364)*** (0.1526)***
Island 0.5653 0.0641 0.4684 -0.3125
(0.7271) (0.7509) (0.8407) (0.8705)
log Dens_urbana 0.2186 0.5290 0.4914 0.7867







Year1 -0.9445 -0.9506 -0.9555 -0.9542
(0.1283)*** (0.1288)*** (0.1296)*** (0.1290)***
Year2 -0.6710 -0.6714 -0.6706 -0.6717
(0.1134)*** (0.1135)*** (0.1136)*** (0.1140)***
N 150 150 150 150
Provinces 50 50 50 50
R2 0.6649 0.5631 0.6085 0.5396
Hansen J 0.387 1.056 1.480 1.275
F-test 16.30*** 5.68*** 7.01*** 4.01***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
in the largest municipalities indicates that the diffusion of cable platforms occurred
in a more uniform manner throughout the country.
The empirical evidence obtained for the density variables reinforces this hy-
pothesis. Specifically, the coefficients estimated for the urban density variable in the
regressions for cable platforms are close to 1, whereas for the same variable in the
case of optical fiber platforms they are much lower (between 0.2 and 0.7). These re-
sults reinforce the hypothesis that the spread of cable platforms occurred more uni-
formly throughout the national territory and directly proportional to the urban den-
sity registered in each province.
In the case of the optical fiber platforms, the operators focused their investments
primarily in those municipalities with optimal features to exploit economies of scale
and density. This would explain why the relationship between the dependent vari-
able and urban density at the province level is not as high for optical fiber platforms
as it is for cable platforms.
As expected, income per capita (GDP) has a significant and positive effect on
optical fiber investments at the province level. This confirms that optical fiber op-
erators tended to concentrate their investments in those provinces with higher income
levels. Again, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the null
hypothesis of orthogonality between the regressors and the instruments, and the F-
statistics of the first stage (see Appendix B) confirm the strength of the instruments.
All these results show that optical fiber operators based their initial investment
decisions strictly on economic grounds. Hence, we may expect the returns on their
investment to be higher, although data do not allow us to confirm this.
As in the case of cable operators, the dummy variable indicating whether the
region is made up of islands has no significant effect on the investment plans made
by optical fiber operators. Finally, the dummy time variables (YEAR1 and YEAR2)
have a significant and negative effect. The high coefficients we obtain for these vari-
ables (with values close to 0.95 for the first year and 0.67 for the second year) in-
dicate that in a period of just a few years (from 2011 to 2013), the volume of invest -
ment in optical fiber platforms grew substantially. By contrast, the coefficients of the
time variables in the case of cable platforms are markedly lower. These different out-
comes indicate that the deployment of optical fiber platforms was especially intense
between 2011 and 2013.
In order to test the robustness of the results in the paper, supplementary equa-
tions have been estimated for cable and optical fiber platforms (see Appendix C).
Thus, the model 5 shows the results using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
while model 6 has been estimated using the Two-stage least squares (IV/2SLS)
method without clustering standard errors by province. The results in Appendix C
are in line with the results discussed above.
3. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the influence of provincial characteristics on the deployment
of cable and optical fiber platforms in Spain during the initial years of their diffusion.
We found marked differences in the respective investment processes, with the results
relating to optical fiber platforms being more consistent with the previous literature.
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The empirical analysis shows that the deployment of cable platforms through-
out Spain was not based on purely economic decisions. The fact that the great ma-
jority of cable operator stock is in the hands of private shareholders, whose objec-
tive is to maximize profits, suggests that certain external factors prevented them from
making their investment decisions on economic grounds alone. Here, we have noted
that specific regulations governing cable platforms significantly restricted operators’
decisions as to where to focus their investments. As a result, cable operators have
been unable to benefit from the high economies of scale and density that character-
ize all the network industries.
The opposite was true in the diffusion of optical fiber platforms. Here, the em-
pirical evidence shows that economic considerations have driven the location of in-
vestments throughout Spain. It would seem therefore, that the regulations applied to
these platforms have not had a negative impact on their diffusion.
The empirical evidence also suggests that the investments of cable operators
were more evenly distributed throughout the territory, while optical fiber operators
focused their investments on a small number of municipalities with large populations
and high levels of income per capita.
Our analysis identifies the regulatory framework as being the chief factor re-
sponsible for the differences in diffusion rates between broadband platforms. Ow-
ing to a complex public procurement procedure, the regulatory framework limited
the freedom of cable operators to decide where to focus their investments. In the case
of optical fiber platforms, the regulatory framework placed no similar restrictions on
the geographical areas in which operators could invest nor did it restrict the num-
ber of operators who could invest within the same territory.
In short, we conclude that the regulatory framework significantly affected the
competitiveness of cable networks and has undermined inter-platform competition.
Indeed, this seems to explain why intra-platform competition has become the essen-
tial variable in promoting broadband adoption in the Spanish market. Furthermore,
it should be stressed that this may well have had an aggregate negative impact on
broadband deployment, since the economics literature shows that rivalry between dif-
ferent platforms promotes the adoption of broadband services among the population.
In the more recent case of the deployment of optical fiber platforms, we have
not found any empirical evidence suggesting that the regulatory framework has bi-
ased investment decisions. Indeed our results indicate that operators have deployed
their platforms in line with their efforts to exploit density economies. Thus, the dif-
fusion of optical fiber platforms should offer a new opportunity to reap the benefits
of inter-platform competition.
Finally, it is likely that the regulatory framework pursued different objectives in
each case. The regulation of cable networks took into account specific objectives of
industrial policy, for example, distribution targets, while the regulation of optical fiber
network had the main objective of maximizing competition in the broadband market.
These differences produced different results, as we have seen above. The main prob-
lem in the case of the cable regulatory framework was that, by not prioritizing the prof-
itability of investment, most cable operators suffered financial problems and they were
never able to become significant competitors with the xDSL operators. In fact, most
of the national cable network was bought in 2014 by Vodafone, an operator which
started its activity in fixed platforms as an alternative xDSL operator.
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APPENDIX A
Table 9: CABLE PLATFORMS REGRESSIONS. FIRST STAGE RESULTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 8.6562 8.8243 8.8407 8.9375
(0.3889)*** (0.3787)*** (0.3611)*** (0.3016)***
log Ext_urbana 0.0079 -0.0041 -0.0055 -0.0130
(0.0231) (0.0219) (0.0211) (0.0175)
Island 0.0066 0.0245 0.0168 0.0337
(0.0686) (0.0654) (0.0699) (0.0662)
log Dens_urbana 0.0814 0.0690 0.0655 0.0565







Year1 -0.0819 -0.0830 -0.0830 -0.0846
(0.0111)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0112)***
Year2 -0.0235 -0.0247 -0.0246 -0.0257
(0.0104)** (0.0101)** (0.0103)** (0.0100)**
log Unemployment -0.2352 -0.2276 -0.2316 -0.2273
(0.0461)*** (0.0473)*** (0.0448)*** (0.0430)***
Firms_large 1749.2 1718.4 1638.7 1531.5
(576.92)*** (561.57)*** (548.40)*** (448.71)***
N 137 137 137 137
Provinces 47 47 47 47
R2 0.7577 0.7511 0.7500 0.7455
Partial R2 0.5917 0.5812 0.5810 0.5542
Test F 16.36*** 39.79*** 44.04*** 40.64***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
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APPENDIX B
Table 10: OPTICAL FIBER PLATFORMS REGRESSIONS. FIRST STAGE RESULTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 9.3354 9.3296 9.4199 9.3492
(0.2084)*** (0.1899)*** (0.1805)*** (0.1862)***
log Ext_urbana -0.0177 -0.0172 -0.0247 -0.0199
(0.0142) (0.0128) (0.0122)** (0.0126)*
Island 0.0979 0.0970 0.1011 0.0977
(0.0506)** (0.0468)** (0.0525)** (0.0472)**
log Dens_urbana 0.0106 0.0111 0.0038 0.0074







Year1 -0.0793 -0.0792 -0.0804 -0.0809
(0.0176)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0176)***
Year2 -0.0409 -0.0408 -0.0417 -0.0422
(0.0091)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0090)***
log Unemployment -0.3733 -0.3731 -0.3762 -0.3773
(0.0641)*** (0.0632)*** (0.0627)*** (0.0636)***
Firms_large 2208.4 2214.4 2042.7 1937.1
(452.39)*** (445.94)*** (451.29)*** (430.33)***
N 150 150 150 150
Provinces 50 50 50 50
R2 0.7866 0.7866 0.7839 0.7856
Partial R2 0.6280 0.6303 0.6326 0.6123
Test F 44.88*** 43.44*** 41.76*** 46.57***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
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APPENDIX C
Table 11: SUPPLEMENTARY REGRESSIONS RESULTS BY PLATFORM
Cable platforms Optical fiber platforms
Model 5 Model 6 Model 5 Model 6
(OLS) (IV/2SLS (OLS) (IV/2SLS
without without
clustering) clustering)
Intercept 13.2969 9.5620 6.6689 -3.1851
(4.8180)*** (3.0772)*** (7.1874) (4.5597)
log GDP -1.3536 -0.9591 -0.0411 0.9408
(0.4865)*** (0.3140)*** (0.6434) (0.4149)**
log Ext_urbana 0.7805 0.7929 0.2502 0.3225
(0.0961)*** (0.0570)*** (0.1453)* (0.0944)***
Island -0.2418 -0.2663 0.5924 0.5653
(0.2962) (0.1564)* (0.6870) (0.5201)
log Dens_urbana 1.0176 0.9771 0.2833 0.2186
(0.1303)*** (0.0779)*** (0.1192)** (0.0895)**
City_medium 0.0215 0.0169 0.2990 0.2766
(0.0685) (0.0387) (0.0536)*** (0.0419)***
City_large 0.1262 0.1171 1.763 1.7168
(0.2431) (0.1345) (0.2701)*** (0.1857)***
Year1 -0.3531 -0.3083 -0.9287 -0.9445
(0.0763)*** (0.1034)*** (0.1309)*** (0.1647)***
Year2 -0.2401 -0.2189 -0.6735 -0.6710
(0.0435)*** (0.1037)** (0.1176)*** (0.1714)***
N 137 137 150 150
R2 0.8001 0.7971 0.6756 0.6649
Hansen J – 1.115 – 0.794
Test F 32.36*** 80.35*** 59.84*** 104.9***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). E
A
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RESUMEN
El objeto de este trabajo consiste en analizar por qué, en ciertos países, la ri-
validad entre plataformas de banda ancha no ha tenido un efecto positivo so-
bre el despliegue de esta tecnología. Controlando por las características de-
mográficas y las variables de red, identificamos el impacto que ha tenido la
regulación sectorial sobre la capacidad competitiva de las plataformas alter-
nativas a la plataforma dominante (xDSL). Para alcanzar este objetivo, ana-
lizaremos el despliegue de las plataformas de cable y fibra óptica en el mer-
cado español. Encontramos que el marco regulatorio específico que se diseñó
para el despliegue de las plataformas de cable perjudicó de forma crítica su
competitividad y, en consecuencia, perjudicó la competencia surgida entre las
distintas plataformas tecnológicas. Por el contrario, nuestros resultados tam-
bién muestran que la regulación específica de las plataformas de fibra óptica
no ha desincentivado un despliegue eficiente de esta tecnología.
Palabras clave: fallo regulatorio, competencia en banda ancha, plataforma
de fibra óptica, plataforma de cable, inversión.
Clasificación JEL: L38, L51, L52, L96.
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